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Abstract Though several prior works use English namely as evidence for the
semantics of other elements, its own syntax and semantics have been mostly un-
examined. In this paper, we focus on two central questions which we claim to
be interrelated. First, what is the semantic contribution of namely? Second, how
does namely combine with the surrounding material compositionally to produce
appropriate overall sentence meanings? Given the apparent similarity of namely
to fragments and Sluicing, one answer suggested in previous literature (e.g. Onea
& Volodina 2011, Weir 2014, Ott 2016) is that an example like Someone coughed,
namely Bill. involves deletion of silent linguistic material . . . Bill coughed. Here,
we argue against this idea, arguing that namely introduces an answer to an implicit
specificational question combining with its complement (i.e. Bill in the above ex-
ample) directly, similar to Qu-Ans analysis of fragments (Groenendijk & Stokhof
1984, Jacobson 2016).
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1 Introduction
One of the central questions in the syntax-semantics interface is how the grammar
treats cases where a propositional meaning emerges from uttering a subsentential bit
of language. For example, fragments like ‘Bill’ can be answers to explicit questions
as in (1) and also to implicit questions, as in (2). In this paper, we aim to expand
this debate through detailed analysis of an analogous but quite underexplored case
study: the use of namely. Fragments with namely are possible in answers to implicit
questions, (2b), as well as – more commonly – within a single speaker, (3).
(1) a. A: Who (just) coughed?
b. B: Bill.
(2) a. A: Someone coughed.
b. B: Yup, Bill. // Yup, namely Bill (cf. Weir 2014)
* Our heartfelt thanks to the organizers, anonymous reviewers, and participants at SALT 28 for their
comments and feedback. Thanks also to Matt Barros and Michael Yoshitaka Erlewine for more
detailed discussion of aspects of the paper.
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(3) Someone did fabulously in semantics, namely Samantha.
For explicit question answer pairs like (1), there have been two main types of
approaches in prior literature:
Clausal ellipsis: In (1) - B’s answer is at some level of structure a full sentence,
with ellipsis: Bill coughed. (e.g. Morgan 1973, Merchant 2004)
Qu-Ans approach: In (1), B’s answer has no unpronounced structure. JBillK com-
bines with a function derived from (or, in some accounts, equivalent to) the
semantics of the question to yield the relevant proposition. (e.g. Groenendijk
& Stokhof 1984, Ginzburg & Sag 2000, Jacobson 2016)
Since namely occurs with fragments in a partially overlapping set of environ-
ments, the same fundamental question arises: does namely arise from clausal ellipsis
or should the Qu-Ans analysis be extended to this case? Beyond this, the cases of
namely which have received the bulk of the attention in previous literature are ones
like (2b) and (3), which have an indefinite in the antecedent material, thus giving the
impression that namely parentheticals are quite similar to Sluicing.
Our main claims are as follows. Despite the superficial connection with Sluicing
and other fragments, namely always introduces an answer to a question which
is implicit and specificational.1 While ellipsis under identity fails to produce a
suitably specificational semantics, the Qu-Ans analysis can be naturally extended to
cover fragments with namely. An attempt to save ellipsis based on a non-identical
specificational sentence (e.g. ‘It is X.’) is semantically viable, but we argue that such
an approach would require a complex set of ad-hoc constraints on the complement
of namely in addition to requiring obligatory ellipsis.
The road map for the rest of the paper is as follows: §2 discusses several problems
for full clausal ellipsis under identity; §3 compares the implicit questions namely
addresses with those of Sluicing, arguing that only the former are specificational; §4
extends the Qu-Ans approach to namely; §5 shows how specificational semantics
emerges from this semantics and accounts for several seemingly aberrant cases;
§6 argues that non-identity-based elliptical alternatives offer no advantage over the
present approach and have several disadvantages; §7 concludes.
1 The observation that namely introduces ‘specificational’ material is not novel to the present paper.
Among others, Onea & Volodina (2011) and Ott (2016) make this same observation. Despite that,
however, they do not incorporate this observation into their analyses; both argue for the clausal
ellipsis analysis shown above in which the full semantics of the namely fragment does not directly
make a specificational contribution. Our analysis differs from these in proposing that the namely
complement is the answer to a specificational question (i.e., not the question who coughed? but rather
a question which is paraphrased more accurately as something like who was that person?
389
AnderBois and Jacobson
2 Problems for full clausal ellipsis under identity
The question of how the complement of namely contributes its propositional infor-
mation has not been widely studied, but recent accounts (Onea & Volodina 2011
for the corresponding German case of nämlich, Weir 2014, Ott 2016) propose full
clausal analyses with ellipsis under identity:2
(4) a. Speaker A: Someone coughed.
b. Speaker B: Yup, namely Bill coughed.
(5) Speaker A: Someone coughed, namely Bill coughed.
This would make the requisite identity condition similar to that needed for
Sluicing under an ellipsis analysis of the latter. Notice that recent ellipses analyses of
Sluicing require not only some sort of syntactic identity to an overt antecedent, but
it has also been argued to require reference to implicit questions (Ginzburg & Sag
2000; AnderBois 2014). At first glance, then, it appears that a clausal analysis like
that above requires nothing additional beyond what is needed for Sluicing (under an
ellipsis analysis of the latter). An additional benefit to subsuming the conditions for
namely to those needed independently for Sluicing centers on the contrasts in (6).
Thus AnderBois (2014) notes that Sluicing is impossible in (6b) because the first
clause does not raise the appropriate question; namely is similarly impossible here:
(6) a. Someone passed the course, {namely Samantha/and I know who}.
b. It’s not true that no one passed the course, {*namely Samantha/*and I
know who} (cf. AnderBois 2014 for Sluicing case)
But the conclusion that the conditions for namely ellipsis can be subsumed to
those for Sluicing ellipsis is too hasty; there are several problems with this. First, the
putative full clausal variant for namely does not always have the right semantics:
(7) Fred scaled the tallest building in the world, namely Burj Khalifa.
The primary import of the namely part is not to tell us what building Fred scaled
(though it indirectly does tell us this) but to specify what the tallest building is.
Second, since the full clausal variants with namely are ungrammatical (unlike in
Sluicing), ellipsis would thus have to be obligatory (see Jacobson (2009) for (8a)):
2 Working on German nämlich, Onea & Volodina (2011) suggest that some kind of nonclausal analysis
is also compatible with their observations, but argue nonetheless for the full clausal analysis of the
sort shown in (4-5). However, although many of the observations we make are noted in this and other
works in German cited therein, the question he uses to combine with the complement of namely is
not a specificational one, so our analysis is not the same as his. We should also mention that German
nämlich – which is their focus – has a use that English namely does not have. In all other respects,
though, the facts they report for nämlich are the same as English namely; this is relevant for our
discussion in §6.
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(8) a. John knows who coughed, namely Bill /*namely Bill coughed.
b. Someone coughed, namely Bill/*namely Bill coughed.
Third, namely can be licensed in cases where no specific overt antecedent is
plausible, as in (9), making it difficult to see how identity-based ellipsis can work.
(9) Scenario: I know that my roommate Sarah is applying to graduate schools,
and I come home to see her popping open a bottle of champagne.
a. Me: A graduate acceptance?
b. Sarah: Yup, namely NYU!
Fourth, the elements that license namely differ significantly from those licensing
Sluicing; we now turn to this in detail.
3 Sluicing and namely: different implicit questions
Basic examples with namely in previous literature often have indefinite antecedents,
as in (2b) and (3), which might give the impression that namely and sluicing may
be used in similar sets of environments. Beyond just being understudied, one likely
reason for this is that namely has often been used to diagnose epistemic or free-
choice inferences (e.g. by Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito (2010), Condoravdi
(2015)), where ordinary indefinites have served as controls. For example, in the
literature on -ever free relatives, the infelicity of namely has been used to distinguish
epistemic/free choice readings from other indifference readings. While the contrast
between indefinite and free-choice antecedents may suggest that namely has a similar
distribution to Sluicing, a closer looks shows their distributions to be quite different.
First, whereas Sluicing prototypically relies on existential/indefinite antecedent
material, namely readily allows for definite antecedents. In particular, definite
descriptions whose definiteness is achieved via uniqueness, rather than familiarity,
readily serve as hosts for namely, as in (7) and (10-11).3 In contrast, as seen in
(10-11), corresponding Sluices are consistently degraded (as are non-elliptical full-
clausal controls in many cases). One subcase discussed in previous literature are
maximal/definite free relatives like (11), which Condoravdi (2015) argues allow for
namely (following Dayal (1997), upon whose original example (11) is based).
3 We leave it to future work to explore in more details the potential predictions and ramifications of
this distinction. One case where this generalization makes a clear prediction is for languages which
morphosyntactically distinguish uniqueness and anaphoric definites (see, e.g. Schwarz (2009), Jenks
(2015)). For example, Schwarz (2009) argues that German preposition-article contractions (e.g. zum
‘to the’) encode uniqueness, while uncontracted forms (e.g. zu dem) encode familiarity/anaphoricity.
We therefore make the clear prediction that only the former should be compatible with nämlich
‘namely’, presuming that it is similar to English namely in relevant respects.
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(10) Fred scaled the tallest building in the world, { namely Burj Khalifa / *and
I’ll tell you which/what}.
(11) I ate what Mary cooked, { namely ratatouille / *but I don’t know what}.
While uniqueness-based definite descriptions represent a case where namely
works but Sluicing doesn’t, we also find the opposite: i.e. cases where only Sluicing
works. One such case is what have come to be known as ‘sprouting’, i.e. cases in
which the elliptical question relates semantically to the prior material either as an
adjunct or implicit argument. As seen in (12), parallel examples with namely are
typically not possible (though see §5 for discussion of an apparent counterexample).
(12) a. Sharon was murdered, {but I don’t know by whom/ *namely by Charles}.
b. Juan celebrated his graduation, { but I don’t know where/ *namely on the
beach}.
The second case where Sluicing is possible but namely is not is with disjunctive
antecedents, as in (13a). Disjunctions pattern with indefinites in serving as an-
tecedents for Sluicing (as discussed by AnderBois (2014)), but corresponding cases
of namely are ill-formed. Their infelicity is all the more puzzling since indefinites
with domains explicitly restricted to the same set of options are markedly better. We
set aside the case of disjunction here, as we believe it tells us more about the nature
of disjunction than it does about namely (see §7.1 for further discussion).
(13) a. We’ll hire Sally or Ted, {and I know which/*namely Sally}
b. We’ll hire one of Sally and Ted, namely Ted.
A somewhat more complicated case, first discussed by Jacobson (2009), is
presented by embedded questions. First, the situation with Sluicing itself remains
is complicated to begin with.4 Romero (1998) claims that embedded wh-questions
can license Sluicing provided that the larger clauses containing them meet a focus
condition by contrasting in some way. This claim is illustrated by examples with
contrasting wh-phrases and contrasting subjects, (14a-14b). In apparent contrast to
this generalization, however, a difference in the question-embedding verb itself does
produce a similarly felicitous example, as seen in (14c). We leave it to future work
to example the Sluicing data in more detail, concluding here only that embedded
questions can only serve as antecedents for Sluicing under limited conditions.
(14) a. We know how many papers this reviewer has read, but we don’t know
which ones. Chung, Ladusaw & McCloskey 1995
4 Thanks for Matt Barros for discussion of the Sluicing data in this area and analytical issues they raise.
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b. We know how many papers this reviewer has read, but THEY don’t know
how many. Romero 1998
c. #? We don’t know how many papers this reviewer has read, but we wonder
how many.
Turning to namely, we find that examples with namely and embedded questions
are impeccable, even when corresponding Sluices are infelicitous, as in (15). While
there may be a temptation to attribute the ungrammaticality of the Sluicing example
to a principle such as Max-Elide, this is not possible here since there is no larger
elliptical competitor: . . . he himself hasn’t has a different meaning, and Null
Complement Anaphora (i.e. . . . he himself has not figured out) is not grammatical.5
(15) John couldn’t sleep. His therapist finally realized what was bothering him,
{namely, his fear of being fired/*but he himself has not yet figured out what}
While namely is licensed by embedded questions even when Sluicing is not,
embedded questions with namely are, however, not always possibleerent constraint.
First, they depend on the lexical semantics of the embedding predicate, as seen in
(16). Second, holding the predicate constant, we find that negated counterparts of
otherwise impeccable examples are quite bad.
(16) *Isabel wondered who got an A on the test, namely Sally.
(17) John {has/*hasn’t} figured out who I plan to give the prize to, namely Sally.
To summarize, then, we find that while overlapping in the cases which have
been most discussed previously – indefinites and free-choice elements – the range of
antecedents for Sluicing and namely differs substantially, as summarized in Table 1.
Having shown that Sluicing and namely differ substantially in the range of
antecedents that license them, we turn now to explain the distribution of namely.
Taking the embedded question data as a jumping off point, note that the felicitous
uses of namely are those which also readily license an individual discourse referent
(or are good in contexts where such a referent is already available), as seen in (18).
5 Note that the namely phrase in embedded questions such as (15) cannot attach to what and hence
cannot be seen as a genuine ‘appositive’ (we recast the example using shorter material, to rule out the
possibility that the ill-formedness is due to having material that is too heavy as an appositive):
(i) a. John figured out who I will give the prize to – namely Sally.





Free choice No No
(Uniqueness) Definite No Yes
Sprouting Yes No
Disjunction Yes No
Embedded question Depends on prosody Depends on semantics
Table 1 Summary of antecedents for Sluicing and namely
(18) a. John has figured out who I plan to give the prize to. She deserves it.
b. John hasn’t figured out who I plan to give the prize to. ?*She deserves it.
c. Isabel wondered who got an A on the test. *?He will thank his tutor.
Returning then to (6) – which at first glance suggested a parallel with Sluicing
– the explanations for the unacceptability of (6b) in the two cases are somewhat
different. In particular, AnderBois (2014) argues that Sluicing is bad in this case
because the double negation prevents the potential QUD (i.e. ‘issue’ in the sense
of inquisitive semantics) from being made salient, while namely is unacceptable
because it does not evoke a discourse referent. Indeed, this is a classic ‘marbles’
example of the sort attributed to Barbara Partee and discussed in Heim 1982 and
subsequent work. Of course it is likely that these two observations about double
negation are at some deeper level related, but they are not prima facie the same, and
so we leave open here the questions of whether and how they are to be unified.
(19) further shows that the parallelism between namely and the licensing of a
discourse referent extends beyond indefinites and definites to implicit arguments,
doubly negated indefinites, and other ‘sprouting’-like cases.6
(19) a. Sharon was murdered. *He was quite scary.
b. It’s false that no one passed the course. *She was a terrific student all
semester.
Whereas Sluicing requires a salient question or issue in prior discourse, for
namely, then, we claim that it is the licensing of an individual discourse referent
which is required. This generalization is spelled out informally in (20). Note that
this also extends to the graduate acceptance example in (9), where a pronominal
reference to the school is quite acceptable (e.g. . . . Yup, and it’s one of the best
6 The one place the parallelism breaks down is in the case of disjunction. While we leave a detailed
investigation of disjunction to future work, see §7 for arguments that the infelicity of disjunction with
namely is due a conflict between specification and the felicity of conditions of disjunction in general.
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school for sociolinguistics!). Conversely a minimally different case with no prior
linguistic material of any kind such as one where the speaker just sees the roommate
popping the cork on the champagne bottle neither provides a discourse referent for a
school nor allows for the use of namely.
(20) Namely generalization: namely is licensed if and only if (i) there is material
in the preceding discourse which supports a discourse referent, and (ii) the
fragment serves to further specify that discourse referent.
The basic insights it captures are very similar to those expressed in the few recent
works which discuss namely such as Onea & Volodina 2011 and Condoravdi 2015.
However, these works each focus more on one half of the generalization than the
other because of the specific empirical focus they have. Onea & Volodina’s (2011)
empirical focus is on German nämlich, which has a variety of non-specificational
uses as well and so while the authors explicitly acknowledge the specificational
nature of cases like the ones here, the need for a discourse referent to be specified
is backgrounded in their discussion since German nämlich, unlike English namely,
does have certain uses where no such discourse referent is required.7
Condoravdi (2015), on the other hand, proposes essentially the same general-
ization as in (20), but based solely based only on data from plain and ever free
relatives. As such, her discussion focuses on the availability of discourse refer-
ents, with little discussion of the role that specification plays in determining the
distribution of namely (e.g. the infelicity of namely with proper names and strongly
familiar/anaphoric definites). By considering a broad range of different (potential)
antecedents for namely, we hope to have shown that both parts of the generalization
have important roles to play and that together, they account for the whole range of
(potential) antecedents for namely.
Having presented a generalization about the distribution of namely, we turn now
to develop a compositional analysis of namely that captures it. Condoravdi 2015 is
a paper about free relatives and since its discussion of namely is a side note in this
other endeavor, does not develop an account of the compositional syntax/semantics
of namely beyond the generalization. Onea & Volodina (2011), on the other hand,
propose for nämlich an ellipsis based account of the sort we have argued against
above in §2. While they claim that “not much seems to hinge on this”, the argue we
make here is precisely the opposite – that careful consideration of the specificational
semantics of namely and the conditions under which it occurs obliges a non-elliptical
account (see §6 for further discussion).
7 Moreover, while they do talk in various places about English namely, their analysis is quite explicitly
an analysis of German nämlich and they also are careful to note that “There is a whole class of what




4 A Qu-Ans implementation which accounts for this generalization
We have seen that namely introduces the answer to an implicit specificational
question about a discourse referent, and that a specificational question is not the
same as the implicit question relevant for Sluicing. Moreover, the question must be
implicit; namely cannot introduce an answer to an explicit question:
(21) A: Who coughed? B: *Namely, Bill.
We return to this below.
We are now in a position to extend the Qu-Ans analysis to the case of namely.
Recall that the Qu-Ans analysis of the dialogue in (22) relies on applying the function
in (23a) with the answer in (23b) to give the proposition in (23c):
(22) Speaker A: Who coughed? Speaker B: Bill
(23) a. λx[ JcoughedK(x) ]
b. JBillK
c. JcoughedK(JBillK)
The question then arises as to what contributes the function in (23a). Ginzburg
& Sag (2000) and Jacobson (2016) take this to actually be the meaning of main
clause questions (Jacobson notes that this is true only of main clauses; embedded
clauses can still have the Hamblin semantics). However, this will not do for the case
of namely, because we assume that implicit questions are Hamblin sets. But this is
not a problem: Groenendijk & Stokhof (1989) (henceforth G&S) show that there is
a simple mapping from the function in (23a) to the relevant Hamblin question and
vice-versa. Take any Hamblin question; for example the Hamblin question for (23a)
is the set of propositions of the form Jcoughed′(x)K for all x in some relevant domain
D. Call that set HQ. Then the corresponding G&S function (notated as GS(HQ) ) is
the function f with domain D such that for all x, f(x) is a member of HQ. (HQ can
similarly be derived from the relevant f ; it is the set of propositions P such that for
all x f(x) is in P.) With this, the lexical entry for namely is as follows:
(24) Syntax: selects for any constituent of a certain category (this is some distin-
guished set of categories which are just those that also occur in short answers
in general, in fronted position in Topicalization, etc.)
Semantics: JnamelyK= λX [λQ[GS(Q)(X)] ]
where Q an implicit specificational question and X is a variable ranging over
any of the types that correspond to the categories of allowable complements
of namely.
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In prose, then, namely asks for some complement and an implicit question, derives
the GS function from that question, and applies that function to the meaning of its
complement.
This does leave open several interesting questions. Note first that as stated here,
the fact that the question must be implicit is hardwired into the semantics of namely.
This can be seen as a temporary fix; we would hope that this follows from something
more general. The most hopeful possibility is that an overt question like that in (21)
simply doesn’t support the requisite specificational question. It does introduce a
discourse referent as shown by the availability of subsequent anaphora:
(25) A. Whoi did best on the final? B. I’ll give you a hint – theyi are only a
sophomore.
Nonetheless, it could well be that this doesn’t support a specificational question
about this discourse referent. Alternatively, it might be that there is a constraint to the
effect that parenthetical material can never serve as ‘at issue’ content (see, e.g. the
case of non-restrictive relatives discussed in Potts 2005, AnderBois, Brasoveanu &
Henderson 2015 and others and Onea 2016 for a broader discussion of this including
German nämlich), and namely X tends to be a parenthetical. Unfortunately, this does
not seem to cover all the cases; it by itself does not rule out Namely Bill as a bare
answer to the question in (21) (nor is it clear that it is right to call it a ‘parenthetical’
in (4)). We thus leave this issue open for future research, being content to temporarily
build the implicit question restriction in to the lexical semantics of namely. Second,
this also means that the grammar must have access to the notion of a ’specificational’
question (or, presumably also statement). We leave open the question of how to
define this notion in detail.
One further contrast to note about the account proposed here is that while it
makes reference to implicit questions, the necessary implicit questions are not QUDs
in the sense of Roberts (2012). The account here relies on implicict specificational
questions, which while salient in the discourse are not ones which the interlocutors
were previously committed to resolving (a defining property of QUDs in Roberts’s
(2012) sense). In some cases, such as (26), the form of the antecedent material may
implicate that the identity of the discourse referent is irrelevant or unknown, and
therefore not a likely issue of conversation.
(26) I ate {something/what} Alejandro baked.
In contrast, although they note the specificational nature of namely in their
prose, previous analyses like that of Onea & Volodina (2011) that make use of
non-specificational clausal sources also assume that the implicit question this content
addresses is a QUD rather than an implicit specificational questions. While some
works such as Ginzburg 1996 and Onea 2016 have developed more permissive
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notions of QUD that treat specificational implicit questions as a particular kind of
QUD, this does not change the fact that the implicit questions namely addresses
are only the specificational ones whose resolution is not a prior commitment of the
speaker. We leave open the question of whether a notion of implicit question that
unifies these two types is feasible or desirable for other purposes, but for namely the
distinction is an important one.
5 Specificational semantics emerges compositionally
In the previous section, we have presented a proposal for the syntax and semantics for
namely in which namely X is a function taking a function derived from an implicit
specificational question and returning the proposition obtained by applying that
function to X. That is to say, it returns true if and only if the complement of namely
specifies a prior discourse referent, thereby answering the specificational question.
While the internal composition of namely is therefore quite distinct from that of
specificational copular clauses, we nonetheless ensure that semantic restrictions that
hold of specificational copular clauses will also hold of namely by virtue of the fact
that they must hold of the implicit question namely employs.
For example, Higgins (1979) describes at length the configurations of different
kinds of elements such as demonstratives, proper names, definites, and indefinites
that allow for specificational readings in copular clauses. For example, a proper
name can stand in the specification relation to (k.e. can “specify”) an indefinite noun
phrase, (27a), while reverse is not possible, (27b). Beyond this Higgins (1979) argues
that other grammatical phenomena such as wh-movement and ellipsis can be used to
distinguish specificational copular clauses from other types. For example, as seen in
(28), he shows that VP-Ellipsis distinguishes specificational copular sentences from
non-specificational ones.
(27) a. Jack Jones was a man I met yesterday.
b. *A man I met yesterday was Jack Jones.
(28) a. My neighbor is Ellie, *my best friend isn’t. 4 Spec
b. Ellie is my neighbor, Sally isn’t. 8 Spec
As shown in (29-30), these same asymmetries are found with namely (see also
Ott 2016 for similar observations):
(29) a. *I got coffee with Jack Jones, namely a man I met yesterday.
b. I got coffee with a man I met yesterday, namely Jack Jones.
(30) a. I’m bringing a pie to my neighbor, namely Ellie. 4 Spec
b. *I’m bringing a pie to Ellie, namely my neighbor. 8 Spec
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Beyond this, Higgins (1979) shows that specificational copular clauses are possi-
ble with a wide variety of different syntactic categories for which a transformational
analysis is not feasible, as in (31). Once again, we see that analogous examples with
namely are possible in (32).
(31) a. Mitka’s (silliest) fear is of the left side of the bridge.
b. They told me that that what Mary was going to do was give the dog to
John.
(32) a. Mitka has a silly fear, namely of the left side of the bridge.
b. They told me what Mary was going to do, namely give the dog to John.
Note that examples like (32a) appear at first blush like they might be examples
of ‘sprouting’ uses of namely and therefore inconsistent with the generalization
in §3. In particular, it may seem that of the left side of the bridge would be a
complement to fear. Comparing this case with the ungrammatical ‘sprouting’ cases,
repeated in (33), we see a clear difference. Whereas the apparent sprouting in (32)
have specificational copular counterparts in (31), the ungrammatical ‘sprouting’-like
cases like (33) plainly do not, as seen in (34).
(33) a. Sharon was murdered, {but I don’t know by whom/ *namely by Charles}.
b. Juan celebrated his graduation, { but I don’t know where/ *namely on the
beach}.
(34) a. *Sharon was murdered is by Charles.
b. *Juan celebrated his graduation is on the beach.
Whereas Sluicing allows for ‘sprouting’ examples regardless of where there is a
specificational copular counterpart, namely only allows for this in the cases like (32a)
where a specificational copular counterpart is possible. As discussed above, this sort
of pattern provides a knockdown argument against the namely material arising from
a full clause silenced under identity, as opposed to a non-specificational copular
clause. Whereas the possibility of a non-copular counterpart is at least correlated
with the grammaticality of Sluicing (though see van Craenenbroeck 2010, Barros
2014 for arguments that this is not always so), for namely it is only the existence of
a specificational copular counterpart which is important.
While we have shown that the potential for namely fragments is related to that of
specificational copular clauses, this of course does not mean that namely fragments
arise from non-pronunciation of parts of a covert specificational copular clause.
Rather, the account we have developed relies on the semantic notion of specification,
which is itself what determines both the use of namely fragments and as Higgins
(1979) argues, the properties of specificational copular clauses. While we therefore
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do not have a similarly knockdown argument against an approach relying on ellipsis
with specificational copular clauses as sources, we show in the next section that such
an approach does not buy anything over ours and requires fairly unusual additional
assumptions to be made.
6 Could ellipsis be saved?
So strong is the desire to derive all propositional content of short utterances from
full sentences, that several people (including two anonymous SALT reviewers) have
suggested ways to account for our generalization using ellipsis. These attempts
require abandoning ellipsis with an identity condition (as in the full clausal ellipsis
analyses shown in (4-5)), and instead derive these from the silencing of a constant
such as it is X or pro is X; the former is similar to proposals such as van Craenen-
broeck 2010 to derive some Sluices from ‘short clefts’. Before proceeding, let us
unpack the possibilities a bit more. One is that the ‘source’ is pro is X for ‘pro’
some pronoun picking up the relevant discourse referent, and is being specifica-
tional/identificational be. This seems unlikely since a regular pronoun is generally
not allowed in corresponding full cases (without namely – full cases with namely are
always bad to which we return):
(35) A man coughed.
a. It was Bill.
b. #He was Bill.
Instead, then, let us consider an analysis where it be is silenced; hence (5), for
example is:
(36) Someone coughed, namely it was Bill.
But what is the analysis of the it was Bill clause itself? The use of the term ‘short
cleft’ for similar cases in the Sluicing literature suggests that overt it be X clauses
themselves (as in (35a)) actually are full clefts with some material silenced:
(37) It was Bill who/that coughed.
In the namely case, then, the wh-portion is silenced by the general process allowing
‘short clefts’, and the it be portion silenced by an additional mechanism (supposedly
also alive in those cases in which Sluices are argued to be hidden short clefts).
But that can’t be the right analysis of these so-called short clefts, because this
simply reintroduces the problem of what licenses the silencing of the wh-portion.
Consider again (38) with either the namely continuation or equally well with an
overt it is and no namely:
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(38) a. Fred scaled the tallest building, namely it is Burj Khalifa which/that is the
tallest building.
b. . . . it is Burj Khalifa which/that is the tallest building.
As seen in our earlier discussion of the clausal ellipsis theory, there is no possible
identity condition which could support the ellipsis of which/that is the tallest build-
ing, so a literal cleft with silenced material cannot be the underlying representation
of the it is X clause.
Similarly, there could be no identity-based silencing analysis for cases like the
graduation acceptance in (9). The underlying full cleft for Sarah’s answer would
have to be something like (39b-39c) or some other potential paraphrase, none of
which will satisfy any kind of identity condition on ellipsis:
(39) Scenario: I know that my roommate Sarah is applying to graduate schools,
and I come home to see her popping open a bottle of champagne.
a. Me: A graduate acceptance?
b. Sarah: Yup, namely it was NYU that I got into!
c. Sarah: Yup, namely it was NYU that accepted me!
This leaves us with the conclusion that ‘short cleft’ is a misnomer (at least for
these cases), but there are perfectly viable alternative analyses of overt It was Bill
cases as in (35a). We will not spell out all the full details here nor the full set of
possibilities, but let us assume that it is a pronoun picking up some discourse-salient
object that can be paraphrased as ‘the identity of the person who coughed’, and be
again is the specificational be. Or, perhaps it is anaphoric to the implicit question, and
the full construction has the question/answer semantics of specificational sentences
put forth in Ross 1985 and Schlenker 2003.8
Let us see what it would take to formulate such an analysis. First, we need
a rule allowing for the silencing of a constant of the form it be X where is is the
specificational be. A believer in “Sluicing from short clefts” might argue that this is
independently motivated for the Sluicing case - but our data reveals a heavy caution
for that analysis of some Sluices. For, if ellipsis of it be is generally allowable in
Sluicing, then there is no explanation for the different distribution of namely and
Sluicing. For example, there is no reason why (11) should be bad in the Sluicing
8 But beware of a potential circularity in relying on those analyses. For they derive the answer portion
of what they analyze as a question answer pair analysis of specificational sentences as a full clause.
This, then, would simply reintroduce all of the same problems about satisfying an identity condition.
While we do not necessarily reject a ‘hidden question/answer’ analysis for some specificational




case (see §7.2 for discussion). Second, we still need the grammar to access the
notion of a specificational sentence as this applies only with be of ‘specification’.
Third, this places quite a heavy burden on the complement of namely: it is
only allowed to take a complement of the form it beSPEC X. It is rather unusual
for a lexical item to select such details about the inner makeup of its complement
(compare this to our syntactic analysis of namely). Semantically, it presumably is the
identity function on implicit specificational questions, or implicit questions about the
identity of some discourse referent. We leave open exactly what restrictions would
need to be build in on the domain of this identity function, but we can note that here
too something will be needed to ensure that namely is possible only with material
that addresses an implicit question. Note that it is X is a perfectly good answer to an
explicit question as in (40); it is only with namely that this would be blocked:
(40) A: Who coughed? B. It was Bill. / *Namely, it was Bill.
Moreover, this analysis has no advantage over ours with respect to certain
matching effects that we have not yet dealt with. There are some preposition
matching effects in English which are complex and so space precludes a discussion
of these, but let us consider case matching in the corresponding German case of
nämlich. Ott (2016) points out that these show the same kind of case matching
effects found in Sluicing; we assume that the analysis of nämlich is similar to our
analysis of namely (modulo the fact that nämlich has an additional use discussed
in Onea & Volodina 2011; otherwise their distribution seems quite parallel). Our
analysis has no account of this; the hope would be that something like the direct
matching approach of Ginzburg & Sag (2000) for Sluicing would extend here.9 But
the silencing of it be also provides no such account since matching is normally not
required in such cases (see Merchant 2001 for discussion of this with respect to the
Sluicing from short cleft analyses). So nothing is to be gained by this kind of ellipsis
analysis with respect to matching phenomena.10
Finally, and most strikingly, unlike for most cases of so-called ellipsis, the
silencing is obligatory, since the following is completely bad11:
(41) Someone coughed, *namely it was Bill.
9 Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984), Ginzburg & Sag (2000), and Jacobson (2016) all provide an account
of Case Matching of direct question-answer pairs under the Qu-Ans analysis. Unfortunately, that
account will not extend directly to the case of implicit question-answer pairs, as the interested reader
can verify.
10 Ott (2016) gives other rather common ‘connectivity’ arguments for ellipsis in a range of ‘appositives’
including namely – arguments based on, e.g., reflexive distribution and ‘bound variable’ connectivity.
These arguments have been answered for similar cases at least as early as Jacobson 1994 and Sharvit
1999; see Jacobson 2016 for discussion concerning the fallacy of these kinds of arguments in general.
11 Matt Barros (p.c.) suggests to us that the ‘source’ could be not what we have, but rather (i) with
parenthetical intonation, which he reports to be grammatical in his judgment.
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And note that it is not enough to just require silencing of it was but again the
lexical entry for namely will require that it be X be the complement and nothing
else with specificational semantics, since (42) and other more lengthy specificational
options are equally bad:
(42) a. Someone coughed, *namely the person who coughed was Bill.
b. Someone coughed, *namely the identity of the person who coughed was
Bill.
In sum, there is no obvious advantage to an ellipsis analysis and several disad-
vantages. The grammar still requires access to the notion of specification; it requires
access to questions which are only implicit, the syntactic portion of the lexical entry
for namely is considerably more complex than in our theory; the semantics might
be simpler but this is not clear since the ‘implicit question’ part needs to be built
in somewhere; this requires a rule of silencing (not independently motivated) and
some principle to make it obligatory here. This seems to be a lot of trouble merely to
preserve the intuition that all fragments which give rise to propositional inferences
are underlyingly clausal.
7 Conclusions and future directions
In this paper, we have presented a detailed examination of the syntax and semantics
of fragments with English namely. What little previous literature there is on namely
(and related words like German nämlich) has analyzed such fragments as being
the results of deletion under identity of a full clause. While adopting some of the
insights of this literature – most notably, Onea & Volodina’s (2011) claim that namely
fragments serve a specificational function – we have argued against the viability
of a deletion under identity-based approach. Specifically, we have argued that the
putative full clausal sources are not themselves grammatical and even if they were,
do not produce the necessary specificational semantics.
Instead, we have proposed an account on which namely does not rely on deletion
under identity with some prior linguistic material, but rather, composes directly
with the surface fragment. In particular, we have extended the Qu-Ans approach to
other kinds of fragments, claiming that namely composes with the fragment and (the
(i) Someone coughed, it was, namely, Bill
In our judgments, this full clausal version is not possible and we have been unable to find
naturally-occurring examples of this sort, and so we leave to future work to determine whether such
full-clausal sentences are possible for some speakers. Setting aside these concerns about the data
itself, this potential source still leaves open the question of how to license the ellipsis from (i) and
additionally requires an explanation for the intonational difference with the elliptical forms.
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G&S function variant of) an implicit question specifying a prior discourse referent.
The account therefore predict the core empirical generalizations we have made
for namely: namely is licensed if and only if (i) there is material in the preceding
discourse which supports a discourse referent, and (ii) the fragment serves to further
specify that discourse referent by addressing this implicit specificational question.
Similar to accounts of Sluicing that rely on (potential) QUDs or related notions
(e.g. Ginzburg & Sag 2000, AnderBois 2014), the account relies on the idea that the
compositional semantics must have access to implicit questions. However, despite
this commonality, the nature of the implicit questions needed in the two cases is
quite different in ways that shape the range of contexts in which each is possible.
For example, uniqueness-based definite descriptions and certain embedded questions
both introduce discourse referents and therefore license namely, even when further
specifying this discourse referent was not a salient issue in discourse. Sluicing, on
the other hand, is not possible in these cases for precisely this reason (see below).
On the other hand, there are cases such as sprouting with adjuncts, where a salient
implicit question can license Sluicing, but no discourse referent is licensed and so
namely is correspondingly impossible. All of this is to say that Sluicing and namely
involve different sorts of implicit questions and correspondingly have quite different
distributions. These differences have been underappreciated in previous literature
in large part because the kind of antecedent material that has been most discussed
– indefinites – introduce both a salient issue of the sort needed for Sluicing and a
discourse referent in need of specification.
7.1 The case of disjunction
There is, however, one case we have seen where the parallel between the avail-
ability of discourse referents and the licensing of namely appears to break down:
disjunctions such as (43), repeated from (13).
(43) We’ll hire Sally or Ted, *namely Sally.
While there are many complex details about the conditions under which such
‘external anaphora’ is available (see Simons 1996 and references therein for dis-
cussion), disjunctions often license a discourse referent in subsequent discourse,
as in (44). Even in cases where this is possible, however, namely remains quite
infelicitous as we have seen. Another minimal pair is found in (45).
(44) We’ll hire Sally or Ted, and they will sit at the desk over there.
(45) a. My father caught a trout or a seabass yesterday, *namely a sea bass.
b. My father caught a trout or a seabass yesterday and then gutted it in the
sink.
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Since our first condition for namely is met (material supporting a discourse
referent), we tentatively conclude that it is the second condition that is the issue
here, i.e. the ability for the discourse referent to be further specified. Concretely, it
seems reasonable to assume that the semantics/pragmatics of disjunction generally
is incompatible with specifications of the relevant kind since it requires in some way
that both of the two disjuncts be live options in order to be felicitous. In essence,
then, the hope would be that disjunction patterns together with free choice items
like wh- + ever, which as discussed by Condoravdi (2015) and references therein,
similarly resist further specification despite supporting discourse referents. We leave
it future work to explore precisely why disjunction produces this effect (especially
since ordinary indefinites do not).
7.2 Implications for sluicing
Finally, while not directly relevant to the analysis of namely per se, our study reveals
two interesting facts/consequences for the analysis of Sluicing. First, the different
distribution of material that licenses namely and Sluicing casts doubt on analyses
of the latter which allows some Sluices to be elliptical for ‘short clefts’, assuming
that by this is meant some sort of specificational material. Consider for example the
case of the free relative in (46) which hosts namely but not a Sluice: (*I ate what she
cooked, but I don’t know what). But a full version with what it was is good:
(46) I ate what she cooked, but I don’t (exactly) know what it was.
An advocate of “sluice from short cleft” might object to this argument by
claiming that in the good (46) it is the referential pronoun it and not the it (presumably
an expletive) that one finds in a ‘short cleft’. While it is difficult to know (especially
since it is not clear exactly what is meant by a ‘short cleft’) we can note that the full
cleft is fine here too and so if the item it in so-called short clefts is the same as that
item in full clefts, then (46) should have an analysis in which it is an expletive:
(47) I ate what she cooked, but I don’t know (exactly) what it was that she cooked.
Again, then, there is no obvious reason why the putative short cleft source for
Sluicing should be unavailable. Hence, just as it is unlikely that namely complements
are elliptical for material of the form namely it is X, it is also unlikely that the
complements of wh-words in Sluicing are elliptical versions of this kind of material.
Second, we have introduced a new puzzle: why is it that embedded questions such
as those discussed in Section 3 often do not license Sluicing (while some others do,
see above discussion)? We note again that this is not due to MaxElide. We have no
answer for this question, but as far as we know this has not been previously observed
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